Kaspersky’s incident responders have detailed a ransomware attack in which the BlackNevas group destroyed an organization’s VMware environment over 10 days without exploiting any vulnerability in the virtualization layer. The attackers used stolen administrator credentials and VMware’s own management features, which means patching alone would not have stopped them.
What happened
Kaspersky’s Global Emergency Response Team (GERT) published its findings on Securelist on November 13. According to the report, the intruders went after four ESXi hosts, every virtual machine running on them, both vCenter Server Appliances, and the connected backup infrastructure. Ransom notes named BlackNevas, a group first observed in November 2024.
Credentials taken from systems outside the virtualization environment gave the attackers a way into the vCenter appliances. On the backup servers, they gained administrative execution and extracted stored credentials, which turned the backup system into a bridge to other infrastructure.
On the disaster-recovery vCenter appliance, the attackers logged in over SSH as root and deployed the MeshAgent remote-management tool 43 seconds later. That session lasted 2 minutes 26 seconds. About four hours later they returned through MeshAgent and installed a Ligolo-ng tunnel as a systemd service named vmware-vdma, a label chosen to look like normal VMware software.
Next they abused vCenter Host Profiles, a feature meant to enforce host configuration, to turn on SSH for the ESXi hosts. Roughly eleven minutes passed between the first configuration read and SSH becoming available. Later SSH connections to the hosts came from the vCenter appliance itself, a source most networks treat as trusted.
The attackers also crippled recovery before the final step. Antivirus in the backup environment was disabled days earlier, then backup services were stopped and recovery infrastructure was encrypted. The ESXi payload arrived over SFTP and ran a roughly 16-second self-test about three hours before the wipe. On the disaster-recovery host, every virtual machine stopped within 23 seconds. Investigators found that about the first 2 KB of virtual disk files had been overwritten, which can leave guests unbootable but does not by itself prove the data is unrecoverable.
Why it matters
Security agents inside virtual machines cannot see a hypervisor process rewriting their disks, and the report notes Broadcom does not support installing third-party agents on ESXi or the vCenter appliance. Valid logins also look like routine administration. The case shows how a single compromise spanning the management, identity and backup layers can take down an entire virtual estate, even when the hypervisor is fully patched.
What to do
- Treat vCenter as a top-tier asset: dedicated admin accounts, phishing-resistant MFA through supported identity federation, and tightly restricted management-network access (Securelist recommendation).
- Do not reuse domain or workstation admin credentials for vCenter, ESXi or backup systems (Securelist recommendation).
- Alert on the sequence, not single events: a Host Profile change that enables SSH outside an approved change window, followed by an SSH session from vCenter (Securelist recommendation).
- Forward ESXi and vCenter logs, including auth.log, shell.log, vpxa.log and vobd.log, to storage outside the virtualization environment. ESXi keeps logs in memory that is cleared on reboot.
- Design backups as a separate security boundary with their own admin identities, and test a restore on the assumption that vCenter and production Active Directory are unavailable.
- Our analysis: review who holds vCenter admin rights and whether those passwords are used anywhere else, check the appliance’s systemd services for anything not on your approved list, and search for the vmware-vdma service name and the indicators in the Securelist report.
What we still do not know
The report does not name the victim or say how the credentials were first stolen. The ESXi payload was not available, so attribution rests on the ransom notes and a command-line style that resembles the Trigona and BlackNevas family, not on a binary match. Investigators could not determine how the virtual machines were shut down, and the report does not say how many disks proved unrecoverable.
Sources: Kaspersky GERT on Securelist, Nov. 13, 2026; Cyber Security News, Nov. 16, 2026.
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